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Abstract
Recently we have witnessed a number of rapid shifts toward populism in the rhetoric and
policies of major political parties, as exemplified in the 2016 Brexit Referendum, 2016 US
Election, and 2017 UK General Election. Our perspective here is to focus on understanding
the underlying societal processes behind these recent political shifts. We use novel methods
to study social dynamics behind the 2016 Presidential election. This is done by using net-
work science methods to identify key groups associated with the US right-wing during the
election. We investigate how the groups grew on Twitter, and how their associated accounts
changed their following behaviour over time. We find a new external faction of Trump sup-
porters took a strong influence over the traditional Republican Party (GOP) base during the
election campaign. The new group dominated the GOP group in terms of new members and
endorsement via Twitter follows. Growth of new accounts for the GOP party all but collapsed
during the campaign. While the Alt-right group was growing exponentially, it has remained
relatively isolated. Counter to the mainstream view, we detected an unexpectedly low num-
ber of automated ‘bot’ accounts and accounts associated with foreign intervention in the
Trump-supporting group. Our work demonstrates a powerful method for tracking the evolu-
tion of societal groups and reveals complex social processes behind political changes.
Introduction
Donald Trump’s victory in the GOP primaries and the Presidential race surprised political
analysts and confounded pollsters. Trump achieved this victory via a populist campaign which
incorporated racially-charged and misogynistic language [1, 2]. This unusual campaign shifted
the direction of the GOP and the US right-wing toward the far-right of the political spectrum
[2]. An important factor behind this success was the campaign’s use of social media communi-
cation channels, especially Twitter [3].
Twitter, and social media in general, have become important tools for politicians and their
followers to spread political messages [4–8]. The hierarchical structures commonly found in
social media networks mean that well-connected politicians act as hub nodes, with informa-
tion and influence spreading outward over the network. Political parties form clusters which
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reside at the centre of these networks [5, 8–10]. As intra-party discourse is increasingly taking
place online, traditional boundaries between politicians, activists, party-members and mem-
bers of the public have become increasingly blurred.
The increased openness of parties moving their political discourse online has undoubted
benefits for transparency and accountability. The concern is the opportunity this provides for
an external group to target the online presence of a political party, and then start to dictate
their political direction. The ability of a minority group to rapidly generate a new political fac-
tion and take control of a major political party in this way can cause problems for democracy
[11, 12]. Such a novel process would differ radically from more traditional models of dynamics
amongst political elites who occupy different internal factions of a party [11, 13], moving to a
model whereby external factions play a stronger role [13–15]. In this work we look for evi-
dence of an external group influencing the online presence of the GOP in the run up to the
2016 election and how this can explain the shift in the party’s direction.
Recent changes in the rhetoric and policy platform of the GOP provide an example of the
impact of external groups. During the 2016 election cycle, the Alt-right—an online community
of activists who identify as white nationalists—emerged as a major influence on GOP political
discourse. The Trump campaign and pro-Trump media outlets like Breitbart News co-opted
Alt-right rhetoric, provoking a movement from implicit racial priming in campaigns to
explicit racial messaging [2]. Trump and his supporters were able to use the shock value of
explicit racial rhetoric to gain media attention for his platform, without destroying the GOP’s
electoral calculus. The Trump campaign marked a large and sudden shift in rhetoric and target
demographics in 2016, unprecedented in modern US political history [16].
Our work seeks to understand how communities of activists might provoke such a signifi-
cant shift in the attitudes and rhetoric of a major political party. We looked for how political
activists organised themselves and their political messaging, and how these aspects changed
over time. We did this by examining Twitter data in the context of the 2016 election, given
that Twitter has been shown to reflect US national polling aggregates accurately [17]. By study-
ing these changes, we can analyse and document shifting allegiances during the election cycle,
and the roles of different factors driving these dynamics.
Results
Our data gathering approach was designed to focus on accounts related to right-wing US poli-
tics. To do this we designed our sampling technique around the principle that accounts of sim-
ilar political allegiance tend to follow each other [7, 18] and sampled approximately 250,000
Twitter accounts. We then identified groups within our sample where members of the same
group tended to follow one another [19], a method shown to find groups with shared political
interests [7]. To find those interests we automatically characterised each group using biograph-
ical information on member profiles [18] (see Methods). This approach identified a number
of right-wing groups based in and outside of the US. We generated a picture of how members
of the groups follow one another (see Fig 1 for groups > 2000 members and S1 Fig for
groups > 200 members).
We focused in greater detail on the three focal groups which we identified in Fig 1. We
would expect that the members of these groups joined Twitter due to certain political events,
plotting the rate of new accounts created against time for each group demonstrates this in
more detail (see Fig 2). The figure shows how all three groups were influenced by particular
events including the Tea Party movements of 2009, the presidential election of 2012 and
Trump’s campaign launch in mid-June 2015. After the 2012 presidential election growth of the
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GOP group stagnated. After Trump’s campaign announcement growth of the GOP group
stalled while growth of the Trump group accelerated.
To better understand the decrease in growth rate of the GOP, we looked for evidence of an
ideological shift. Political ideology can be inferred by examining which political actors a Twit-
ter user is following [20]. Consequently, we looked at how the following behaviour of the
group members changed over time. For each member of one of our groups, we estimated the
proportions of accounts in each group which were followed by that member, on a monthly
basis (see Methods for how we inferred following dates). The per-member average proportion
of accounts followed between the groups is shown in Fig 3. We animate these patterns of fol-
lowing behaviour, along with the group sizes over time, in a video (see S1 File). The figure
shows how, over time, there is a shift from members of the Trump and GOP groups both fol-
lowing members of the GOP group to both following members of the Trump group. This indi-
cates a shift in ideological position of the party to that associated with the Trump group.
A few concerns may be raised about the quality and breadth of our data, which we now
address. It has been widely proposed that computational propaganda from automated Twitter
Fig 1. Map of far right groups sampled. We found three distinct groups of accounts associated with Trump’s campaign. These are emphasised with
stronger colours:(a) GOP group, (b) Trump group, and (c) Alt-right group. The plot shows all groups (> 2000 members) found by our sample linked
according to how often their members follow accounts in other groups, and annotated with words used significantly commonly in the biographies of the
group’s members. The thickness of links was calculated by recording, for each member of the originating-group, the proportion of accounts which were
followed in the linked-group, and then taking an average of these proportions. Links are the same colour as the group containing the following accounts
and point to the group containing the followed accounts. The most cohesive group (thickest self-loop) is the Trump group with an average member having
70% of the accounts they have followed being in the same group. The largest group was size 55,730, (marked �).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854.g001
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accounts (bots) and/or foreign intervention may have played a strong role in developing
Trump’s online following [21, 22]. A consequence of this may be that our data may be mostly
comprised of such bots. Furthermore, the accounts we have found are relatively few in com-
parison to the US electorate. To address these points we estimated the numbers of bots in each
group, and calculated the number of followers on the whole of Twitter which follow at least
one account in each group (see Table 1, and S2 Fig for distributions). The numbers of bots is
low, and there is a greater proportion of bots in the GOP group than the Trump group. This is
not consistent with the idea that the Trump group was generated using automated accounts.
Further, our tests of the entire sample indicate that less than 200 out of some 250,000 sampled
accounts have been flagged as being accounts from Russia [23]. Consequently, we argue our
data contain a large number of genuine Twitter accounts formed into cohesive groups. Due to
their large numbers of followers, these accounts will have acted as amplifiers for the messaging
of Donald Trump’s campaign and are likely to have had a profound influence on the primary
and presidential elections in 2016.
Discussion
The method presented here shows how it is possible to uncover underlying socio-political pro-
cesses behind real political change. This is done by first identifying online groups, and then
observing how they grow over time and how their members change the other accounts they
follow. Political changes reflect these underlying processes so the ability to observe them is crit-
ical. Consequently, this approach is likely to be of great value in the social and political sci-
ences. Twitter’s important role in party political communication and activism means that we
can use this method to study shifting political discourses in a way we never could before,
enabling us to develop more powerful theories of socio-political dynamics.
To study social and socio-political processes, our method incorporates two key novel
aspects. First, an innovative sampling procedure which allows us to target and download key
groups of interest. Second, our generated data shows how groups evolve over time, including
the shifting allegiances of group members. Since these data are dynamic networks, this
approach can enhance our understanding of dynamic social processes. While much modelling
Fig 2. Changing growth rates of each group. Shows how a decrease in new accounts aligned with the GOP group
coincided with a growth in the Trump and Alt-right groups, especially after Trump’s campaign announcement in June
2015. We plot the growth rates over time of the three focal groups: Trump (orange diamonds), Alt-right (purple Xs),
and GOP (red circles). Events shown: p, Tax Day Events on 12 April 2009 associated with the Tea Party Movement; q,
2012 US elections on 6 November 2012; r Trump’s election campaign announcement on 16 June 2015; s 2016 US
elections on 5 November 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854.g002
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Table 1. The three focal groups have few bots and are widely followed by other accounts on Twitter. We estimated
numbers of bots by testing 2,000 accounts using Botometer [24] (scores>0.8 were deemed bots). The number of fol-
lowers was the number of unique accounts on the whole of Twitter that had followed at least one account in each
group. The number of followers for all three groups combined is 57 million, comparable in size to the 63M who voted
for Trump in the election. Figures are given to 2 d.p., K means thousands, and M means millions.
Group Size Bots Followers
GOP 44K 4.0% 38M
Trump 52K 1.5% 25M
Alt-right 16K 0.71% 9.2M
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854.t001
Fig 3. Accounts followed shifted from GOP to the Trump group. After the 2012 election, there was a shift from
following accounts in the GOP group to following accounts in the Trump group (panels a, b and c). Members of the
Alt-right group have increasingly followed one another over time (panel b), but are not followed by GOP or Trump
group members (panels a and b). Each of the three panels show how the members of one focal group followed
members of the groups over time. The time traces show the proportions of accounts that were followed in the Trump
(orange line), Alt-right (purple dash-dotted line), or GOP (red dashed line) groups, averaged over each member in the
originating group. Events shown (p, q, r, and s) are as in Fig 2. The data points have very small 95% confidence
intervals (shaded areas, see Methods) which demonstrates that this pattern is highly statistically significant: The
members of a group largely changed their following-behaviour in concert.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854.g003
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854 April 9, 2019 5 / 11
work has been done [25–29], the next step is to bring these models to data such as that pre-
sented in this work [30–33].
Given the self-selecting nature of Twitter groups, we may be concerned that the groups we
have found may not truly reflect the position of the party’s base. However, the high levels of
intra-group connections are representative of an interconnected political party [7, 18]. The
behaviour observed in this sample during the 2016 election cycle does match the behaviour
seen during the rise of the Tea Party and victory of Trump in the primary elections. The sam-
ple here was targeted initially at the Alt-right, but we found connected accounts which were
also associated with the right-wing of both the US and other countries, suggesting that the
sample has captured a wide swathe of right-wing political communication and not just fringe
groups or extremist individuals. The sample also went beyond the right-wing political sphere
and sampled a loosely intra-connected group of general Twitter accounts (see group marked �
in Fig 1), indicating that it had captured a comprehensive picture of those accounts associated
with the US right-wing.
Social media has continued to expand its influence over the political process [4–10, 17].
These technologies enable individuals to easily connect with one another, based on shared
political opinions. It follows that they are likely to be playing a strong role in recent social-
political movements by allowing politicians to rally disaffected individuals. At the very least,
social media data allow us to observe the processes behind changing political factions. Under-
standing these processes, and how they happen is critically important to understanding mod-
ern democracy and voter behaviour, and our method marks a step change in how political
factions can be identified, analysed, and tracked.
The data we have presented show how, starting from June 2015, an external faction shifted
the GOP away from its previous base. This shift could be explained by results from another
study, which indicate that as support for an extreme position increases, support for a corre-
sponding less extreme position will increase with a nonlinear relation [28]. Reasons for the
emergence of the Trump group are less clear because it is relatively isolated from the more
extreme alt-right group. There is, however, a potential role played by automated accounts
where even a small number of bots were shown to have been able to shift opinion in Trump
supporters [34]. That said, our data suggest that Trump’s followers consist largely of real,
highly-engaged supporters.
An alternative perspective looks at psychological reasons behind the shift to the right. Evi-
dence shows that poor levels of well-being and low optimism for the future played a strong
role in the shift toward Trump [35], with economic insecurity and a cultural backlash being
key factors [2, 16, 36]. In this case, our results would indicate that disaffection for a major
political party may have provided space in which a new political movement could grow and
eventually take over that party.
Conclusion
Donald Trump’s ascent to the Presidency has prompted a great deal of effort amongst pollsters,
political scientists and social scientists to unearth the reasons for his unexpected success. Here
we provide a method to follow the shifts in group membership and influence that can occur in
political parties, and in so doing provide indicators of impending moves toward extremism
within those parties. Our results fit into a picture where the Trump campaign’s mobilisation of a
targeted group of supporters more than made up for Clinton’s funding advantage [29, 37]: A
significant shift in the US political landscape. With that in mind, developing a more robust
understanding of how political factions can be identified and analysed can give us a way to fol-
low these fast-appearing and highly-motivated supporter groups, and their influence on politics.
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
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Methods
Ethics
We were given ethical approval for the data collection and storage methods used in this
research by the relevant Departmental Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway University of Lon-
don. Even though all the information downloaded from Twitter is public, it was stipulated that
we would only publish anonymous and/or agglomerate data. Consequently, we are only releas-
ing the Twitter IDs which we sampled for the study and the agglomerate data published in the
manuscript.
Downloading a sample of accounts
Our aim was to bias our sample to download accounts which had a right-wing political orien-
tation, as defined in the American political context. To do this, we developed a novel weighted
snowball-sampling technique in order to download a sample of twitter accounts which all
share similar interests. Given our intent to focus on right-wing groups in the US, we began the
sample with a prominent account followed by a large number of Alt-right and Trump support-
ers: the ‘_altright_’ Twitter account. Our technique biases the sample to accounts that are
more likely to follow accounts which have already been sampled, collecting groups of close-
knit accounts which are closely linked to those accounts already sampled. The process incre-
mentally builds a dataset of accounts starting in a local community and then on to other closely
linked communities. Other community-sampling techniques focus on a single group [38].
We downloaded sample accounts using the Twitter REST API. For each account sampled
we recorded its creation date, biography, and the lists of which accounts they had followed and
which accounts had followed them. People on Twitter tend to follow other accounts quite
broadly but when two accounts follow one another that is a much better indication that they
have something in common. Other approaches have used retweet or mention networks [7,
18], however we decided to use a follower network because these links are more permanent
and less transient. For these reasons we used mutual following to build our network of
accounts.
To download our sample, we maintained a master list of accounts to be sampled, which
each account being assigned a score determining which would be the next to be sampled. For
any new account sampled, we generated a set of all accounts which both followed and were fol-
lowed by this new account. This set of mutual-follower accounts was merged with the master
list of accounts and their sample scores were updated. Score updates were done by dividing the
score of the account which had been sampled equally amongst its mutual followers. The initial
account was assigned a sample score of 1.0 and all other accounts were initiated with a sample
score of 1.0. After the scores were updated, we then identified the highest-scoring account on
our list which had not yet been sampled, and iterated the procedure with that account.
Generating and characterising groups of accounts
Our sample generated a network of accounts with accounts linked to one another based on
whether they had mutually followed one another. We generated community structure for
these accounts using the Louvain Method [19] and used groups at the lowest level of the hier-
archy. The groups found were characterised by generating word frequencies for every word
and pairs of words (unigrams and bigrams) used in the biographies of the Twitter accounts for
each group. Words were converted to lower case and stripped of punctuation.
In order to establish which words or word pairs characterise each group, we compared the
fraction of users that use each word within a group with the fraction of users that used the
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
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word globally [18]. We then assessed how unlikely it was that the difference between these two
fractions could have happened by random chance. This is given by the standardised Z-score
which, for each word/word pair used in community c, is
Z ¼
mc   mg
sg=
ffiffiffiffiffi
Nc
p
where μc is the fraction of users in community c which have used the word, μg is the fraction of
all users that have used it, Nc is the number of users in community c, and σg is the standard
deviation of usage of the word amongst all users
s2g ¼
1
N
mgNð1   mgÞ
2
þ ð1   mgÞNm
2
g
� �
¼ mgð1   mgÞ
where N is the global number of users. The words with the highest Z-Scores are those which
are used more often by and are used to characterise that group.
We ran an initial sample in November 2016, shortly after the Presidential election. To con-
firm the results we found had not been by chance, we reran the sample in July 2017 starting
with the same initial ‘_altright_’ account. However, Twitter had suspended the account in the
interim, so we used a downloaded copy of the account from November 2016 including its list
of followers and used this to seed the sample. The rerun of the process yielded similar results
to the first run.
The sampler found a group with a large number of relatively neutral accounts which were
also loosely interconnected (see starred group in Fig 1). Due to the nature of our sampler, one
would expect to find that, after it had sampled the majority of interconnected accounts associ-
ated with the wider right-wing group, it would then start to sample accounts from the remain-
der of the Twitter web site. These accounts would not be closely interconnected but would be
relatively isolated from the other right wing groups. The biographies of the group members
were also consistent with this picture of the accounts not having strong political affiliations.
Due to the fact that our sampler had sampled a large number of accounts from this looser-knit
group and more-neutral group, we were confident that our sample had covered a broad sample
of right-wing affiliated groups.
Inferring account-following dates
In order to track how accounts shifted their following behaviour over time, we needed to
develop a method to infer the date of each following-event (i.e., when an account followed
another account). Though our data contained a list of accounts followed, the order in which
they were followed, and account creation dates, we did not have the specific dates of following-
events. However, note that it is not possible to follow an account until it has been created. We
used this information to infer that the following-event of an account must have happened after
it was created, and consequently that all subsequent following events in the list must have hap-
pened after that date as well. In the list of accounts-followed we marked timestamp-accounts
by going through the list in the order which they were followed (starting at the earliest
account) and marking those accounts which had been created after all the previous accounts
in the list. All accounts followed in the list after these timestamp-accounts must have been fol-
lowed at some time after the timestamp-account was created. We inferred that the timestamp-
accounts had been followed on their creation date. We then inferred the date-followed for
accounts listed between the timestamp-accounts by spacing these dates evenly between these
creation dates.
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
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Statistical analysis
Our data show how the members of different groups change the way they follow accounts in
the other groups over time. We wanted to statistically confirm that this following-pattern had
not happened due to some random process in the following behaviour of a group’s members.
Consequently we looked at the accounts followed by members of a group on a monthly basis.
For the accounts followed by each member each month, we then calculated the proportions of
these followed-accounts according to the group membership of the followed-accounts. We
then calculated the mean and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for these per-group
proportions. Because the 95% confidence intervals were relatively very small, we concluded
that the patterns we found were highly statistically significant and did not need further testing
to support our argument.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. All groups in the sample. Plot showing the groups found by our sample and summa-
rising the how the accounts follow one antoher at a group level. Groups shown (> 200 mem-
bers) are sized by the number of members. Lines between groups are the same colour as the
originating group. Links are the same colour as the group containing the following accounts
and point to the group containing the followed accounts. The thickness of the line represents
the average proportion of accounts, per individual in the originating group, which are followed
in the linked group.
(PNG)
S2 Fig. Botometer distributions. The distributions of scores assigned by Botometer to sam-
ples of 2,000 accounts taken from each of the three focal groups.
(PNG)
S1 File. Group dynamics. Movie showing the dynamics of the three groups and their follow-
ing behaviour over time. It shows how initial growth and internal following behaviour of the
GOP group is superceded by growth and following of the Trump group. Areas of groups repre-
sent the size of the group at the time shown. For each month, link widths are scaled to repre-
sent the average proportion of accounts, per individual in the originating group, which were
followed in the linked group. Links are the same colour as the group containing the following
accounts and point to the group containing the followed accounts.
(MP4)
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Johannes Mu¨ller for helpful comments. JB was supported by the Economic and
Social Research Council (ES/L000113/1). ES is part of the Complexity in Health Improvement
Programme, supported by the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_12017/14) and the Chief
Scientist Office (SPHSU14).
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: John Bryden, Eric Silverman.
Data curation: John Bryden.
Formal analysis: John Bryden.
Investigation: John Bryden, Eric Silverman.
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854 April 9, 2019 9 / 11
Methodology: John Bryden, Eric Silverman.
Project administration: John Bryden.
Software: John Bryden.
Validation: John Bryden.
Visualization: John Bryden.
Writing – original draft: John Bryden, Eric Silverman.
Writing – review & editing: John Bryden, Eric Silverman.
References
1. Kellner D. Brexit Plus, Whitelash, and the Ascendency of Donald J. Trump. Cultural Politics. 2017;
13(2):135–149. https://doi.org/10.1215/17432197-4129089
2. Valentino N, Neuner F, Matthew Vandenbroek L. The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and
the End of Racial Priming. Journal of Politics. 2018; 80(3):TBD. https://doi.org/10.1086/694845
3. Francia Peter L. Free Media and Twitter in the 2016 Presidential Election: The Unconventional Cam-
paign of Donald Trump. Social Science Computer Review. 2017; p. 0894439317730302.
4. Bennett WL. New media power. In: Contesting media power. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; 2003.
p. 17–37.
5. Farrell H, Drezner DW. The power and politics of blogs. Public Choice. 2008; 134(1-2):15. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11127-007-9198-1
6. Sunstein CR. Republic.com 2.0. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 2009.
7. Conover MD, Gonçalves B, Flammini A, Menczer F. Partisan Asymmetries in Online Political Activity.
EPJ Data Science. 2012; 1(1):6. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds6
8. Duggan M, Smith A. The Political Environment on Social Media; 2016. Available from: http://www.
pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-social-media/.
9. Vergeer M. Twitter and Political Campaigning. Sociology Compass. 2015; 9(9):745–760. https://doi.
org/10.1111/soc4.12294
10. Jungherr A. Twitter use in election campaigns: A systematic literature review. Journal of Information
Technology & Politics. 2016; 13(1):72–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2015.1132401
11. Hume D. Of Parties in General, 1742. In: Perspectives on Political Parties. Palgrave Macmillan, New
York; 2002. p. 33–36. Available from: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230107403_3.
12. Linz PJJ, Stepan PA. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press; 1978.
13. Harmel R, Heo U, Tan A, Janda K. Performance, leadership, factions and party change: An empirical
analysis. West European Politics. 1995; 18(1):1–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389508425055
14. Zariski R. Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations. Midwest Journal
of Political Science. 1960; 4(1):27–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108754
15. Budge I, Ezrow L, McDonald MD. Ideology, Party Factionalism and Policy Change: An integrated
dynamic theory. British Journal of Political Science. 2010; 40(4):781–804. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0007123409990184
16. Schaffner BF, Macwilliams M, Nteta T. Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President:
The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism. Political Science Quarterly. 2018; 133(1):9–34. https://doi.
org/10.1002/polq.12737
17. Bovet A, Morone F, Makse HA. Validation of Twitter opinion trends with national polling aggregates: Hil-
lary Clinton vs Donald Trump. Scientific Reports. 2018; 8. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-26951-y
18. Bryden J, Funk S, Jansen VAA. Word usage mirrors community structure in the online social network
Twitter. EPJ Data Science. 2013; 2(1):3. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds15
19. Blondel VD, Guillaume JL, Lambiotte R, Lefebvre E. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks.
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment. 2008; 2008(10):P10008. https://doi.org/10.
1088/1742-5468/2008/10/P10008
20. Barbera´ P. Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter
Data. Political Analysis. 2015; 23(1):76–91. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpu011
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854 April 9, 2019 10 / 11
21. Bolsover G, Howard P. Computational Propaganda and Political Big Data: Moving Toward a More Criti-
cal Research Agenda. Big Data. 2017; 5(4):273–276. https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2017.29024.cpr
PMID: 29235917
22. Bovet A, Makse HA. Influence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election. Nature
Communications. 2019; 10(1):7. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2 PMID: 30602729
23. Frommer D. Here are 2,752 Russian Twitter accounts that trolled you; 2017. Available from: https://
www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-twitter-trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list.
24. Varol O, Ferrara E, Davis CA, Menczer F, Flammini A. Online human-bot interactions: Detection, esti-
mation, and characterization. In: ICWSM; 2017.
25. Gross T, Blasius B. Adaptive coevolutionary networks: a review. Journal of the Royal Society Interface.
2008; 5(20):259–271. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2007.1229
26. Bryden J, Funk S, Geard N, Bullock S, Jansen VAA. Stability in flux: community structure in dynamic
networks. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface. 2011; 8(60):1031–1040. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.
2010.0524 PMID: 21123254
27. Mantovani MC, Ribeiro HV, Moro MV, Picoli S, Mendes RS. Scaling laws and universality in the choice
of election candidates. EPL (Europhysics Letters). 2011; 96(4):48001. https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-
5075/96/48001
28. Ramos M, Shao J, Reis SDS, Anteneodo C, Andrade JS, Havlin S, et al. How does public opinion
become extreme? Scientific Reports. 2015; 5:10032. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep10032 PMID:
25989484
29. Bo¨ttcher L, Herrmann HJ, Gersbach H. Clout, activists and budget: The road to presidency. PLOS
ONE. 2018; 13(3):e0193199. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193199
30. Lazer D, Pentland A, Adamic L, Aral S, Barabasi AL, Brewer D, et al. Computational social science. Sci-
ence. 2009; 323(5915):721–723. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1167742 PMID: 19197046
31. Lazer D, Rubineau B, Chetkovich C, Katz N, Neblo M. The Coevolution of Networks and Political Atti-
tudes. Political Communication. 2010; 27(3):248–274. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2010.500187
32. Gonçalves B, Perra N. Social Phenomena: From Data Analysis to Models. Springer; 2015.
33. Weaver IS, Williams H, Cioroianu I, Williams M, Coan T, Banducci S. Dynamic social media affiliations
among UK politicians. Social Networks. 2018; 54:132–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2018.01.
008
34. Hjouji Ze, Hunter DS, Mesnards NGd, Zaman T. The Impact of Bots on Opinions in Social Networks.
arXiv:181012398 [physics, stat]. 2018.
35. Herrin J, Witters D, Roy B, Riley C, Liu D, Krumholz HM. Population well-being and electoral shifts.
PLOS ONE. 2018; 13(3):e0193401. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193401 PMID: 29529049
36. Inglehart R, Norris P. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Back-
lash. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network; 2016. ID 2818659. Available from: https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2818659.
37. Melo HPM, Reis SDS, Moreira AA, Makse HA, A JS Jr. The price of a vote: Diseconomy in proportional
elections. PLOS ONE. 2018; 13(8):e0201654. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201654 PMID:
30133469
38. Wright S, Denney D, Pinkerton A, Jansen VAA, Bryden J. Resurgent insurgents: Quantitative research
into Jihadists who get suspended but return on Twitter. Journal of Terrorism Research. 2016; 7(2):1–
13. https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1213
Underlying socio-political processes behind the 2016 US election
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214854 April 9, 2019 11 / 11
